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Abstract
We introduce a discrete-time search game, in which two players compete to find an object
first. The object moves according to a time-varying Markov chain on finitely many states. The
players know the Markov chain and the initial probability distribution of the object, but do not
observe the current state of the object. The players are active in turns. The active player chooses
a state, and this choice is observed by the other player. If the object is in the chosen state, this
player wins and the game ends. Otherwise, the object moves according to the Markov chain and
the game continues at the next period.
We show that this game admits a value, and for any error-term ε > 0, each player has a
pure (subgame-perfect) ε-optimal strategy. Interestingly, a 0-optimal strategy does not always
exist. The ε-optimal strategies are robust in the sense that they are 2ε-optimal on all finite but
sufficiently long horizons, and also 2ε-optimal in the discounted version of the game provided
that the discount factor is close to 1. We derive results on the analytic and structural properties
of the value and the ε-optimal strategies. Moreover, we examine the performance of the finite
truncation strategies, which are easy to calculate and to implement. We devote special attention
to the important time-homogeneous case, where additional results hold.
Keywords: Search game; sequential game; two-player zero-sum game; subgame perfect ε-equilibrium;
discrete time-varying Markov process.
1 Introduction
The field of search problems is one of the original disciplines of Operations Research. In the basic
settings, the searcher’s goal is to find a hidden object, also called the target either, with maximal
probability or as soon as possible. By now, the field of search problems has produced into a wide
range of models. The models in the literature differ from each other by the characteristics of the
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Search problem 2
searchers and of the objects. Concerning objects, there might be one or several objects, mobile or not,
and they might have no aim or their aim is to not be found. Concerning the searchers, there might
be one or more. When there is only one searcher, the searcher faces an optimization problem. When
there are more than one searcher, searchers might be cooperative or not. If the searchers cooperate,
their aim is similar to the settings with one player: they might want to minimize the expected time of
search, the worst time, or some search cost function. If the searchers do not cooperate, the problem
becomes a search game with at least two strategic non-cooperative players, and hence game theoretic
solution concepts and arguments will play an important role. For an introduction to search games,
we refer to [1], [10], [11], [12], [13], and for surveys see [2] and [16].
We introduce a competitive search game, played at discrete periods in N. An object is moving
according to a time-varying Markov chain on finitely many states. Two players compete to find the
object first. Consider for example two pharmaceutical firms which compete in developing a cure for
a disease that mutates over time. They both know the Markov chain and the initial probability
distribution of the object, but do not observe the current state of the object. Player 1 is active at
odd periods, and player 2 is active at even periods. The active player chooses a state, and this choice
is observed by the other player. If the object is in the chosen state, this player wins and the game
ends. Otherwise, the object moves according to the Markov chain and the game continues at the next
period. If the object is never found, the game lasts indefinitely. In that case, neither player wins.
When the active player chooses a state, he needs to take two opposing effects into account. First,
if the object is at the chosen state, then he wins immediately. This aspect makes choosing states
favorable where the object is located with a high probability. Second, if the object is not at the
chosen state, then knowing this, the opponent gains information: the opponent can calculate the
conditional probability distribution of the location of the object at the next period. This aspect
makes choosing states favorable where, on condition that the object not being there, the induced
conditional distribution at the next period disfavors the opponent. In particular, this conditional
distribution should not be too informative, and for example it should not place too high a probability
on a state. Clearly, in some cases there is no state that would be optimal for both scenarios at the
same time, and hence the active player somehow needs to aggregate the two scenarios in order to
make a choice.
Each player’s goal is to maximize the probability to win the game, that is, to find the object first. In
our model, we do not assume that the players take into account the period when the object is found.
Of course, in most cases, maximizing the probability to win will entail at least partially that each
player would prefer to find the object at earlier periods, thereby preventing the other player from
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finding the object. We refer to Section 5 on the finite horizon and on the discounted versions of the
search game, where the period when the object is found also matters.
The two players have opposite interests, up to the event when the object is never found. More precisely,
each player’s preferred outcome is that he finds the object, but he is indifferent between the outcome
that the other player finds the object and the outcome that the object is never found. As we will
see, the possibility that neither player finds the object will only have minor role, and hence the two
players have essentially opposite interests in the search game.
Main results. Our main results can be summarized as follows.
[1] We study the existence of ε-equilibria. A strategy profile is called an ε-equilibrium if neither
player can increase his expected payoff by more than ε with a unilateral deviation. We prove that
each competitive search game admits an ε-equilibrium in pure strategies, for all error-terms ε > 0
(cf. Theorem 4 and for subgame-perfect ε-strategies cf. Proposition 14). The proof is based on
topological properties of the game. Interestingly, a 0-equilibrium does not always exist, not even in
mixed strategies. We demonstrate it with two different examples (cf. Examples 2 and 3).
[2] We examine the properties of ε-equilibria. We show that in each ε-equilibrium, the object is
eventually found with probability at least 1− ε · |S|, where |S| is the number of states (cf. Lemma 7),
and that the set of ε-equilibrium payoffs converge to a singleton (v, 1 − v), with v ∈ [ 1|S| , 1] as ε
vanishes (cf. Proposition 8 and Theorem 9). This implies that, in such search games, the two players
have essentially opposite interests, and that we may consider v to be the value of the game and the
strategies of ε-equilibria as ε-optimal strategies (cf. Definition 10 and Proposition 11).
[3] We prove that the ε-optimal strategies are robust in the following sense: they are 2ε-optimal if the
horizon of the game is finite but sufficiently long (cf. Theorem 18), and they are also 2ε-optimal in
the discounted version of the game, provided that the discount factor is close to 1 (cf. Theorem 19).
[4] We investigate the functional and structural properties of the value and the ε-optimal strategies (cf.
Theorems 22, 23 and 15). In particular, we consider the set of probability distributions for the location
of the object where choosing a particular state is optimal, and show that this set is star-shaped.
[5] Since the ε-optimal strategies may have a complex structure and may be difficult to identify, we
examine the finite truncation strategies, which maximize the probability to win in a finite number of
periods. We show that each finite truncation strategy, provided that the horizon of the truncation is
sufficiently long, is ε-optimal in the search game on the infinite horizon (cf Theorem 18). Note that
the finite truncation strategies are easy to calculate by backward induction and only require finite
memory.
Search problem 4
[6] We devote attention to the special case when the Markov chain is time-homogenous (cf. Section 3.3),
as time-homogenous Markov chains are well studied in the literature of Markov chains and frequently
used in applications. For time-homogenous Markov chains, we prove additional results. In particular,
if the initial probability distribution of the object is an invariant distribution of the time-homogenous
Markov chain, then the value is at least 1/2, so player 1 has a weak advantage (cf. Proposition 12).
Moreover, if the time-homogenous Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic, then the game admits a
0-equilibrium in pure strategies (cf. Theorem 5).
Related literature
Discrete search problems with a moving object have been widely investigated. [28], [29], [4] and [18]
study the two-state problem. Assuming perfect detection, [26] investigates the three-state problem. [3]
considers the search for a target with Markov motion in discrete time and space using an exponential
detection function. He provides a necessary and sufficient condition for an optimal search plan and
an efficient iterative algorithm for generating optimal plans. [32] studies a discrete effort analogue
of [3], in which searchers decide the effort they want to invest in order to find the object at each
location they visit. General necessary and sufficient conditions which extend Brown’s results to an
arbitrary stochastic process for any mixture of discrete and continuous time and space are given in
[30]. More recently, [14] study a hide-search game in a random graph, that is a graph in which each
edge is available at each period with a positive probability. For extensive surveys, see [2] and [16].
Most of the search games focus on the case of one searcher, or several cooperative searchers. Some
problems with several cooperative searchers and one or several moving targets are mentioned in the
book of [31], where some algorithms are also studied to solve those problems. To the best of our
knowledge, only two models consider several competitive searchers. [27] investigates a non-zero-sum
game in which two searchers compete with each other for quicker detection of an object hidden in one
of n boxes, with exponential detection functions. Each player wishes to maximize the probability that
he detects the object before the opponent detects it. The author shows the existence of an equilibrium
point of the form of a solution of simultaneous differential equations, and gets explicit solution results
showing that both players have the same equilibrium strategy even though the detection rates are
different. [6] investigate the problem in which an agent has to find an object that moves between two
locations according to a discrete Markov process, with the additional costless option to wait instead
of searching. They find a unique optimal strategy characterized by two thresholds and show that,
in a clear contrast with our model, it can never be optimal to search the location with the lower
probability of containing the object. They also analyze the case of multiple agents, where the agents
not only compete against time but also against each other in finding the object. They find different
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kinds of subgame perfect equilibria.
As in [26] we investigate functional and structural properties of the objective function. Nakai proved
that the function that allocates to a probability distribution the average number of looks before finding
the object is continuous, concave and enjoy some linear properties. They also show that the optimal
decision regions (see Section 15) are star-convex. These properties have also been studied in [21] and
in the PhD thesis of [17].
Structure of the paper. In Section 2, we present the model. In Section 3, we examine the existence
of ε-equilibrium, for ε ≥ 0. In Section 4, we argue that the two players have essentially opposite
interests, and we define the value and the notion of ε-optimal strategies. In Section 6, we present
two relevant strategies, namely the finite truncation strategy and the discounted strategy, and we
prove payoff guarantees of those strategies. In Section 5 we present additional results related to the
structural properties of the value, the subgame-perfect equilibria and the case in which the Markov
chain is time-homogeneous. Functional properties of the value can be found in the Appendix. The
conclusion is in Section 7.
2 The Model
The Game. We study a competitive search game G played by two players. Let N = {1, 2, 3, . . .}.
An object is moving according to a discrete-time Markov chain (Xt)t∈N on a finite state space S. The
initial probability distribution of the object over the set S is given by p ∈ ∆(S), and the transition
probabilities at period t are given by an S × S transition matrix Pt = [Pt(i, j)](i,j)∈S2 , where Pt(i, j)
is the probability for the object to move from state i to state j at period t.
At each period t ∈ N, one of the players is active: At odd periods player 1 is the active player, and
at even periods player 2 is the active player. The active player chooses a state st ∈ S, which we call
the action at period t. If the object is at state Xt = st, then the active player finds the object and
wins the game. Otherwise, the object moves according to the transition matrix Pt at time t and the
game enters period t + 1. We assume that each player observes the actions chosen by his opponent
and each player is aware of which actions the himself has chosen in the past. The transition matrices
(Pt)t∈N and the initial distribution p are known to the players.
The aim of each player is to maximize the probability that he finds the object first.
Histories. A history at period t ∈ N is a sequence ht = (s1, . . . , st−1) ∈ St−1 of past actions. By
Ht = S
t−1 we denote the set of all histories at period t. Note that H1 consists of the empty sequence.
Let Nodd = {1, 3, 5, . . .} and Neven = {2, 4, 6, . . .}. We denote by Hodd = ∪t∈NoddHt the set of histories
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at odd periods, and by Heven = ∪t∈NevenHt the set of histories at even periods. Note that at each
history h, the players can calculate the probability distribution for the current location of the object.
Strategies. The action sets for both players are A1 = A2 = S. A strategy σ = (σt)t∈Nodd for player 1
is a sequence of functions σt : Ht → ∆(S). The interpretation is that, at each period t ∈ Nodd, given
the history ht, the strategy σt chooses to search state s ∈ S with probability σt(ht)(s). Similarly,
a strategy τ = (τt)t∈Neven for player 2 is a sequence of functions τt : Ht → ∆(S). We denote by
Σ and T the set of strategies for players 1 and 2, respectively. Note that Σ = ∏h∈Hodd ∆(S) and
T = ∏h∈Heven ∆(S). We say that a strategy is pure if, for any history, it places probability 1 on one
action.
Winning probabilities. We define the stopping time1 of the game by Θ = min{t ∈ N| st = Xt}.
Consider a strategy profile (σ, τ). The probability under (σ, τ) that player 1 wins is denoted by
u1(σ, τ) = Pσ,τ
(
Θ ∈ Nodd), and that player 2 wins is denoted by u2(σ, τ) = Pσ,τ (Θ ∈ Neven). Note
that u1(σ, τ) + u2(σ, τ) = 1− Pσ,τ (Θ =∞). If the object has not been found before period t, and the
history is ht, the continuation winning probabilities from period t onward are denoted by u1(σ, τ)(ht)
for player 1 and u2(σ, τ)(ht) for player 2.
2
ε-Equilibrium. Let ε ≥ 0 be an error-term. A strategy σ for player 1 is an ε-best response against
strategy τ for player 2 if u1(σ, τ) ≥ u1(σ′, τ)− ε for every strategy σ′ of player 1. Similarly, a strategy
τ for player 2 is an ε-best response against strategy σ for player 1 if u2(σ, τ) ≥ u2(σ, τ ′)− ε for every
strategy τ ′ of player 2. A strategy profile (σ, τ) is called an ε-equilibrium if σ is an ε-best response
against τ and τ is an ε-best response against σ.
An alternative interpretation of the game. We call the previous game Model [1]. We present
an alternative model of this game in perfect information. This model is useful in order to prove the
existence of ε-equilibrium for all ε > 0 (cf. Theorem 4).
[2] Another way to describe our game is as follows. One could imagine that the game consists of
two phases. In the first phase the players choose actions. More precisely, in the first phase player 1
chooses an action at odd periods and player 2 chooses an action at even periods just as before. This
results in an infinite sequence of states (s1, s2, . . .). The set of infinite histories is S
∞. Every pure
strategy profile (σ, τ) induces a unique infinite history h∞σ,τ ∈ S∞. In a second phase, players receive
a payoff. Now, for i = 1, 2, consider the payoff function fi : S
∞ → [0, 1] defined as follows. Consider
an infinite history (s1, s2, . . .). Take any pure strategy profile (σ, τ) such that h
∞
σ,τ = (s1, s2, . . .) and
define fi(s1, s2, . . .) = ui(σ, τ). Note that this definition only depends on the realized history. The
1With the convention that min{∅} = +∞
2When we wish to emphasize the parameter p, we will write u1(σ, τ)(p) and u2(σ, τ)(p).
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goal of each player is to maximize his payoff. Note that this is a game without an object. This way
we obtain a two-player perfect information game.
Discussion. We briefly argue that the above descriptions are equivalent. For each pure strategy
profile (σ, τ), for each player i = 1, 2, we have ui(σ, τ) = fi(h
∞
σ,τ ). Then, a strategy profile in one of
the models leads to the same payoff in the other game. The difference is that Model [1] is in imperfect
information, as players only know the probability distribution of the object, while Model [2] is in
perfect information.
Model [1] gives a very clear, intuitive and concrete description of the game. This is the reason why
we usually work with this model in the paper. Model [2] is used as a tool to prove existence of
ε-equilibrium as in Theorem 4.
3 Existence of equilibrium
In this section, we examine equilibria in competitive search games. In the first subsection, we show
that there are search games for which there exist no 0-equilibrium, not even in mixed strategies. From
a technical point of view, this is caused by discontinuity in the payoff functions of the players. In the
second subsection, we focus on the notion of ε-equilibrium, where ε > 0 is an error-term, and prove
that each search game admits an ε-equilibrium in pure strategies, for all ε > 0. We conclude the
section by presenting an ε-equilibrium for the games introduced in the first subsection.
3.1 Search games with no 0-equilibrium
Theorem 1. There exist time-homogeneous competitive search games which admit no 0-equilibrium,
not even in mixed strategies.
We provide two counter-examples: Example 2 and Example 3. A common property of these counter-
examples is that during the game the players are forced to choose states where the probability of the
object is positive but converges to zero when t goes to infinity. In Example 2, this happens within
the class of transient states. In contrast, in Example 3, there are multiple ergodic sets in the Markov
chain, and the players have an incentive to choose states in an ergodic set, even when the conditional
probability that the object is in this ergodic set is very small.
Example 2. Consider the game in Figure 1. In this game, η ∈ (0, 1/4) and the initial probability
distribution is p = (q, q, 1/2− q, 1/2− q), where q ∈ (0, 1/4). Notice that states 1 and 2 have the same
transition probabilities, and so do states 3 and 4. States 1 and 2 are transient, whereas states 3 and
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4 are absorbing.
1 2
3 4
η
2
η
2
1−η
2 1−η
2
η
2
η
2
1−η
2
1−η
2
1 1
Figure 1: A game without 0-equilibrium.
We show that this game admits no 0-equilibrium. The intuition for this claim is as follows. As we
will show, it is not optimal for either player to be the first one who chooses an absorbing state. As a
consequence, both players prefer to choose state 1 or state 2 and wait until the other player chooses
state 3 or state 4. However, if both players do so, they will choose state 1 and state 2 forever, which
is not a 0-equilibrium.
Let σ = (σt)t∈Nodd be the strategy of player 1 defined as follows. For all t ∈ Nodd, for all ht ∈ Ht,
σt(ht) =

state 1 if t = 1,
state 3 if t ≥ 3 and ht(t− 1) = 4
or if t ≥ 3 and ht(t− 1) ∈ {1, 2} and ht(t− 2) 6= 3,
state 4 if t ≥ 3 and ht(t− 1) = 3
or if t ≥ 3 and ht(t− 1) ∈ {1, 2} and ht(t− 2) = 3,
where ht(t − 2) and ht(t − 1) are the second-to-last and the last actions chosen under history ht,
respectively. The idea is that from period 3 onward, σ chooses the most likely location of the object.
Claim 1: When player 1 uses σ he guarantees himself strictly more than 1/2: u1(σ, τ) > 1/2 for
every τ .
Proof of Claim 1: Under σ, player 1 looks at state 1 at period 1 and finds the object with
probability q at period 1. If the object is not found, there is a positive probability that it is in state
2 at period 1, in which case it moves with positive probability to state 3 or state 4 at period 2. Then
player 1 looks at state 3 or state 4 at period 3, depending on the action of player 2 at period 2, and
finds the object with probability strictly greater than 1/2 − q at period 3 no matter the action of
player 2 at period 2.
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Claim 2: Suppose that player 1 follows a strategy σ that looks at state 3 or state 4 at period 1. Then
player 2 has a strategy τ such that u1(σ, τ) ≤ 1/2.
Proof of Claim 2: Let τ = (τt)t∈Neven be the strategy of player 2 defined as follows. For all
t ∈ Neven, for all ht ∈ Ht,
τt(ht) =

state 1 if ht ∈ {1, 2}t−1,
state 3 if ht(t− 1) = 4
or if ht(t− 1) ∈ {1, 2} and ht(t− 2) = 4,
state 4 if ht(t− 1) = 3
or if ht(t− 1) ∈ {1, 2} and ht(t− 2) = 3.
The idea is that τ looks at state 1 if player 1 has never played state 3 or state 4, and plays the most
likely state otherwise. Assume for simplicity that player 1 looks at state 3 at period 1. Assume that
player 1 does not find the object at period 1. The conditional probability for the object of being in
state 4 at period 2 is then equal to
p2(4) =
1/2− q
1/2 + q
+ 2 · 1− η
2
· q
1/2 + q
=
1/2− η · q
1/2 + q
,
which is strictly higher than 1/2 by our assumption that q < 1/4 and η < 1/4. Then, in the
continuation of the game, player 2 guarantees strictly more than 1/2 if he looks at state 4 at period
2. If he does not, player 2 will get strictly less than 1/2 if player 1 looks at state 4 at period 3. For
similar reasons, if period 3 is reached, it is better for player 1 to look at state 3. By repeating this
argument, it is better for player 1 to always look at state 3 against τ .
At period 1, player 1 finds the object with probability 1/2 − q. At period 2, player 2 finds the
object with probability 1/2 − q + q(1 − η). At period 3, player 1 finds the object with probability
q(1 − η) + q(1 − η)η. At period 4, player 2 finds the object with probability q(1 − η)η + q(1 − η)η2.
And so on. Then, player 1 finds the object with probability
1
2
− q + q(1− η) + q(1− η)η + q(1− η)η2 + q(1− η)η3 + . . . = 1
2
− q + q(1− η) 1
1− η =
1
2
.
So, by playing state 3 or state 4 at period 1, player 1 gets at most 1/2 against τ .
Claim 3: There is no 0-equilibrium.
Proof of Claim 3: Assume by way of contradiction that there is a 0-equilibrium (σ′, τ ′). From
Claim 1 and Claim 2, player 1 chooses state 1 or state 2 with probability 1 at period 1. In both
cases, at period 2 the current probability distribution is p2 = (qη, qη, 1/2 − qη, 1/2 − qη). Then, at
period 2, the game is similar to the original one, with a parameter q′ = qη instead of q, which still
satisfies q′ ∈ (0, 1/4), and where the roles of the players are exchanged. Then, as τ is a 0-best response,
it follows from the previous reasoning that player 2 plays state 1 or state 2 with probability 1. By
following this process recursively, players will choose states 1 and 2 with probability 1 forever. This
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leads to the payoff 44−η2 for player 1. Then, player 1 has an incentive to deviate from σ
′ and to choose
state 3 at period 1 to get a payoff of at least 1/2− q > 44−η2 , a contradiction.
Example 3. We present another game with time-homogeneous Markov chain without a 0-equilibrium.
Consider the game in Figure 2. Let η ∈ (0, 1/6) and q ∈ (0, 1/3). Let p = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, q(1 −
η), qη, 1−q2 ,
1−q
2 ) be the initial probability distribution. Notice that in this example there is no transient
state.
1 4
3
2
5 6 7 8 9
1
1
1
1
1/3
1/3
1/3
1 1− η
η 1 1
Figure 2: A game without a 0-equilibrium.
Claim 1: In any 0-equilibrium, at period 1 player 1 chooses state 6 with probability 1.
Proof of Claim 1. If at period 1 player 1 looks at state 6, he guarantees q(1− η) + 1−q2 > 1/2 by
looking at period 3 at state 8 or 9.
If at period 1 player 1 looks at state 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 7, then player 2 can find the object with probability
q(1− η) at period 2 by looking at state 5 and with probability 1−q2 at period 4 by looking at state 8
or 9. As q(1− η) + 1−q2 > 1/2, player 1 cannot get more than 1/2.
If at period 1 player 1 looks at state 8 (respectively, at state 9), then player 2 can guarantee 1−q2 by
looking at state 9 (respectively, at state 8) at period 2 and then q(1− η) · 23 by looking at state 1 at
period 4. As 1−q2 + q(1− η) · 23 = 12 + q(1/6− η) > 1/2 as η < 1/6, player 1 cannot get more than 1/2.
So, there can be no 0-equilibrium in which at period 1 player 1 places a positive probability on a state
different from state 6.
Claim 2: In any 0-equilibrium, at period 2 player 2 chooses state 6 with probability 1.
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Proof of Claim 2. From Claim 1, we know that in a 0-equilibrium, player 1 looks at state
6 at period 1 with probability 1. If he does so, he finds the object with probability q(1 − η)
at period 1. Then, under the condition that the object is not found, the object was in state 7,
8 or 9 with probability 1 at period 1 and the updated probability distribution of the object is(
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ηq1−q(1−η) ,
1−q
2[1−q(1−η)] ,
1−q
2[1−q(1−η)]
)
. Then, the object follows the transition matrix and
the probability distribution of the object at period 2 is(
0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
η(1− η)q
1− q(1− η) ,
η2q
1− q(1− η) ,
1− q
2[1− q(1− η)] ,
1− q
2[1− q(1− η)]
)
=
(
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, q′(1− η), q′η, 1− q
′
2
,
1− q′
2
)
,
where q′ = ηq1−q(1−η) <
q/6
1−1/3(1−0) =
q
4 < q < 1/3 as 0 < η < 1/6 and 0 < q < 1/3. Thus, at period 2
player 2 is facing a similar situation as player 1 at period 1. Claim 2 follows from Claim 1.
Claim 3: This game has no 0-equilibrium.
Proof of Claim 3. Assume by way of contradiction that the game has a 0-equilibrium. From
Claim 1, player 1 plays state 6 at period 1. From Claim 2, player 2 plays state 6 at period 2. By
repeating the same reasoning as in Claim 2, in a 0-equilibrium, the active player looks at state 6 with
probability 1 at each period. Under this strategy profile, the object is found with probability lower
than q < 1−q2 . Hence, it would be profitable for player 1 to deviate and look at state 6 at period 1.
In conclusion, there is no 0-equilibrium.
3.2 Existence of ε-equilibrium
In this subsection we are interested in the existence of ε-equilibrium, where ε > 0. We show that
there is an ε-equilibrium in pure strategies for every search game, and for each ε > 0. The proof relies
on existence results for ε-equilibria in games with Borel measurable payoff functions (see the proof of
Mertens and Neyman in [25]) and with lower semi-continous payoff functions (see [7] and [8]).
Theorem 4. Each competitive search game admits an ε-equilibrium in pure strategies, for all ε > 0.
Proof. Consider the Model [2] of a competitive search game in Section 2. Note that
1. this is a multiplayer perfect-information game,
2. from Proposition 21 it follows that the payoffs are bounded and lower semi-continuous.
Thus by applying Theorem 2.3 of [7], or Mertens and Neyman’s result in [25], to the Model [2], the
game admits an ε-equilibrium in pure strategies for every ε > 0.
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Revisiting Example 2 and 3. In view of Theorem 4, the game in Example 2 has an ε-equilibrium in
pure strategies for every ε > 0. We now present an (subgame perfect) ε-equilibrium in pure strategies
of this game, for all ε > 0.
Let ε > 0. The idea of the ε-equilibrium in pure strategies described here is to choose state 1 for a
long time as long as the other player does the same, and then to choose the most likely between state
3 or state 4 in the remaining game. More formally, for each n ∈ N, let (σn, τn) be the pure strategy
profile defined as follows. For all t ∈ N, for all history ht at period t, for all n ∈ N, let fnt : Ht → S
be defined by
fnt (ht) =

state 1 if ht ∈ {1, 2}t−1 and t < n,
state 3 if ht(t− 1) = 4
or if ht(t− 1) ∈ {1, 2} and ht(t− 2) = 4
or if ht ∈ {1, 2}t−1 and t ≥ n,
state 4 if ht(t− 1) = 3
or if ht(t− 1) ∈ {1, 2} and ht(t− 2) = 3.
Then, we define σnt (ht) = f
n
t (ht) for all t ∈ Nodd, and τnt (ht) = fnt (ht) for all t ∈ Neven and all history
ht at time t. The idea of σ
n and τn is to look at state 1 until period n (if the other player does the
same) and from period n onward (or before if the other player deviates) to look at the most likely
state. We argue that if n ≥ ln ηq−ln 4εln 2−ln η then (σn, τn) is an ε-equilibrium. For simplicity, we assume
that n is odd.
It follows from the Claim 2 of the proof of Theorem 1 that τn is a 0-best-response against σn. It is
then sufficient to show that σn is an ε-best response against τn when n is large enough. From Claim
2 of the proof of Theorem 1 it follows that a 0-best response against τn is to follow the strategy σn+1,
which only differs from σn at period n. Under (σn, τn), player 1 finds the object at period 1 with
probability q, player 2 finds the object at period 2 with probability q.
(
η
2
)
, player 1 finds the object
at period 3 with probability q.
(
η
2
)2
, and so on until period n− 1 where player 2 finds the object with
probability q.
(
η
2
)n−2
. Then in the continuation game that starts at period n it follows from the proof
of Claim 2 in Theorem 1 that both players find the object with probability 1/2. So, player 1 finds
the object before period n with probability q+
(
η
2
)2 · q+ (η2 )4 · q+ . . .+ (η2 )n−3 · q, player 2 finds the
object before period n with probability q.
(
η
2
)
+ . . .+ q.
(
η
2
)n−2
and each player finds the object from
period n with probability 12 ·
[
1−
(
q +
(
η
2
) · q + (η2 )2 · q + ...+ (η2 )n−2 · q)]. This implies that under
(σn, τn) the expected payoff of player 1 is
q +
(η
2
)2
· q +
(η
2
)4
· q + . . .+
(η
2
)n−3
· q +
[
1−
(
q +
(η
2
)
· q +
(η
2
)2
· q + ...+
(η
2
)n−2
· q
)]
· 1
2
and under (σn+1, τn+1), the expected payoff of player 1 is
q +
(η
2
)2
· q +
(η
2
)4
· q + . . .+
(η
2
)n−1
· q +
[
1−
(
q +
(η
2
)
· q +
(η
2
)2
· q + ...+
(η
2
)n−1
· q
)]
· 1
2
.
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Those two terms converge to the same limit q
1−( η2 )
2 +
[
1− q
1−( η2 )
]
· 12 which is the value of the game.
Moreover, difference between these two expressions is∣∣∣∣(η2)n−1 · q − 12 · (η2)n−1 · q
∣∣∣∣ = 12 · (η2)n−1 · q.
Hence, when n ≥ ln
(ηq
4ε
)
ln
(
2
η
) , the difference between those two expressions is smaller than ε so (σn, τn)
is an ε-equilibrium.
With the same idea one can construct an ε-equilibrium in Example 3 where both players choose state
6 until for a long time and then switch to state 8 or 9.
3.3 Time-homogeneous Markov chains
In this subsection, we consider time-homogeneous competitive search games. A game is time-homogeneous
when the transition matrix Pt at each period is the same. In this case, we will denote the transition
matrix at each period by P . For all r ∈ N we denote by P r, the matrix P applied r times.
Recall that a transition matrix P is irreducible if for each entry (i, j), there exists r ∈ N such that
the entry (i, j) of P r is positive. A transition matrix P is periodic of period r ≥ 2 if for all k ∈ N,
P k(x, x) > 0 only if k = r · l for some l ∈ N. If P is not periodic, we say that P is aperiodic. A
subset S′ ⊆ S is ergodic if for (i, j) ∈ S′ × (S\S′), P (i, j) = 0 and the transition matrix P restricted
to the set S′ is irreducible. A state i ∈ S is called absorbing if P (i, i) = 1. A state i ∈ S is transient
if limr→∞ P r(i, i) = 0.
A probability distribution pi ∈ ∆(S) over the set S is called a stationary distribution for the transition
matrix P if piP = pi.
It is known that (see [20], Corollary 1.17 and Theorem 4.9) if the transition matrix P is irreducible,
then there exists a unique stationary distribution pi ∈ ∆(S). If P is also aperiodic, then there exist
constants β ∈ (0, 1) and c > 0 such that for all t ∈ N,
||pP t − pi||TV ≤ c · βt,
where ||p− q||TV = max
A⊂S
∑
s∈A(p(s)− q(s)) is the total variation distance over ∆(S).
Theorem 5. Consider a time-homogeneous competitive search game. Assume that the transition
matrix P is irreducible and aperiodic. Then, no matter the initial probability distribution p, every
strategy profile finds the object with probability 1. Hence, the payoff functions are continuous in this
game, and there exists a 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.
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Proof. As mentioned, the transition matrix P has a unique stationary distribution pi ∈ ∆(S) and
pi(s) > 0 for all s ∈ S. Moreover, there exist constants c > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1) such that |pP t(s)−pi(s)| ≤
c · βt for all t ∈ N, for all s ∈ S and for all p ∈ ∆(S). Hence, there exists t∗ ∈ N with the following
property: for all p ∈ ∆(S), for all s ∈ S, for all t ≥ t∗, we have (pP t)(s) > δ2 , where δ = mins∈S pi(s).
Without loss of generality we can assume that t∗ ≥ 2.
Let α = δ4(t∗−1) . The proof is divided into four steps.
Step 1: Let (σ, τ) be a pure strategy profile, and let (st)t∈N denote the induced sequence of actions.
We show that the object is found during the first t∗ periods with probability at least α.
Proof: For each t ∈ N, let pt = (pt(s))s∈S ∈ ∆(S) denote the probability distribution of the location
of the object at period t, conditional on not being found through the history (s1, . . . , st−1).
If there is a period t ≤ t∗ such that pt(st) ≥ α, then under (σ, τ), the object is found at period t with
probability at least α, if it has not been found before. Hence, the claim of step 1 is true.
Therefore, it suffices to show that if at each period t ≤ t∗ − 1 we have pt(st) < α, then pt∗(st∗) ≥ α.
So assume that at each period t ≤ t∗−1 we have pt(st) < α. The idea of the calculation below is that,
since the object is found with low probabilities at the first t∗− 1 periods, the probability distribution
for the object at period t∗ on condition that it is not found during the first t∗ − 1 periods is almost
the same as the unconditioned probability distribution. That is, pt∗ is close to pP
t∗−1, which is in
turn close to the stationary distribution pi.
Note that, if the players do not condition on the past, the probability distribution of the location of
the object at period t∗ is simply pP t
∗−1. We have
||pt∗ − pP t∗−1||TV ≤ ||pt∗ − pt∗−1P ||TV + ||pt∗−1P − pP t∗−1||TV
= ||p¬st∗−1t∗−1 P − pt∗−1P ||TV + ||pt∗−1P − pP t
∗−1||TV
≤ ||p¬st∗−1t∗−1 − pt∗−1||TV + ||pt∗−1 − pP t
∗−2||TV
= pt∗−1(st∗−1) + ||pt∗−1 − pP t∗−2||TV
< α+ ||pt∗−1 − pP t∗−2||TV
< α · (t∗ − 1) + ||p1 − pP 0||TV
= α · (t∗ − 1)
=
δ
4
.
Here, in the first inequality we used the triangle inequality. In the first equality, we used that pt∗ =
p
¬st∗−1
t∗−1 P , as p
¬st∗−1
t∗−1 is the probability distribution of the location of the object at period t
∗ − 1
conditional on the fact that the object has not been found before period t∗ − 1 and that it is not in
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state st∗−1 at period t∗ − 1 after the history (s1, . . . , st∗−2) and not being in state st∗−1 at period
t∗ − 1. The second inequality is true as ||qP − q′P ||TV ≤ ||q − q′||TV for all q, q′ ∈ ∆(S). The second
equality follows from the above interpretation of p
¬st∗−1
t∗−1 and of the total variation norm. The third
inequality is due to the assumption that at each period t ≤ t∗ − 1 we have pt(st) < α. The fourth
inequality then follows by induction. The last two equalities are due to p1 = p and the choice of α.
Therefore,
pt∗(st∗) ≥ (pP t∗−1)(st∗)− ||pt∗ − pP t∗−1||TV ≥ δ
2
− δ
4
=
δ
4
≥ α.
This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: Consider any strategy profile (σ, τ). We show that the object is found during the first t∗
periods with probability at least α.
Proof: On the finite horizon t∗, each strategy can be equivalently represented as a mixed strategy,
i.e. a probability distribution on the finite set of pure strategies on horizon t∗ (see for example [24]).
Hence, Step 2 follows from Step 1.
Step 3: Consider any strategy profile (σ, τ). We show that the object is found with probability 1
under (σ, τ). By Proposition 21, this will imply that the payoff functions are continuous in this game.
Proof: By Step 2, the object is found during the first t∗ periods with probability at least α. Since
t∗ and therefore α do not depend on the initial distribution of the object, if the object is not found in
the first t∗ periods, then it will be found between periods t∗ + 1 and 2t∗ with probability at least α.
By repeating this argument, the object is found with probability 1 under (σ, τ).
Step 4: We show that there exists a 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.3
Proof: In view of Theorem 4, for each n ∈ N, there exists a 1n -equilibrium (σn, τn) in pure strategies.
Since Σ and T are compact and metrizable, by taking a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that
the sequence (σn, τn)n∈N converges to a strategy profile (σ, τ) in pure strategies as n→∞ .
For each n ∈ N, we have u1(σn, τn) ≥ u1(σ′, τn) − 1n and u2(σn, τn) ≥ u2(σn, τ ′) − 1n for all σ′ ∈ Σ
and τ ′ ∈ T . Since by Step 3 the payoff functions u1 and u2 are continuous, by taking the limits as
n → ∞, we obtain u1(σ, τ) ≥ u1(σ′, τ) and u2(σ, τ) ≥ u2(σ, τ ′) for all σ′ ∈ Σ and τ ′ ∈ T . Hence,
(σ, τ) is a 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.
Remark 6. Consider a time-homogeneous search game. If this game does not satisfy the condition
of Theorem 5, i.e. the transition matrix is not irreducible or not aperiodic, then the conclusion of
Theorem 5 is no longer true, and there is even an initial probability distribution of the object and a
3By Step 3, the payoffs in the game are continuous. Since there is perfect information in the model representation
[2], it follows from [9] en [15] that there even exists a subgame perfect 0-equilibrium in pure strategies.
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strategy profile under which the object is found with probability zero. Indeed, if the transition matrix
is not irreducible or not aperiodic, we distinguish the following three (not exclusive) situations: (i)
If there is a transient state, then consider an initial probability distribution which places probability
zero on every transient state and a strategy profile which always chooses a transient state. (ii) If there
is more than 1 ergodic class, then consider an initial probability distribution which places probability
1 on an ergodic class and a strategy profile which always chooses a state in another ergodic class.
(iii) If there is a periodic ergodic class, then consider an initial probability distribution which places
probability 1 on a state. Then due to periodicity, at each period there is a state where the object is
with probability zero (see Exercise 1.6 of [20]). So consider a strategy profile which always chooses
such a state.
4 Payoff properties under ε-equilibrium and existence of the
value
Competitive search games are not constant-sum games, and the payoff functions are not continuous as
mentioned in Proposition 21. We will first show that if a player chooses an ε-best response against the
strategy of the other player, the payoffs almost add up to 1. Thus, the game is essentially constant-
sum, so the notion of value becomes natural. Then, we show the existence of the value of these games,
to finally prove existence of ε-optimal strategies for both players for all ε > 0 and relate optimal
strategies and equilibria.
Lemma 7. Consider a strategy τ for player 2. Let ε > 0. If the strategy σ of player 1 is an ε-best
response against τ , then under (σ, τ) the object is found with probability at least 1 − ε · |S|. In other
words,
u1(σ, τ) + u2(σ, τ) ≥ 1− ε · |S|.
A similar statement holds with exchanged roles of the players.
Proof. Note that the sequence of events ([t < Θ < +∞])t∈N is decreasing and its limit is the empty
set. Thus, (P(σ,τ)(t < Θ < ∞))t is decreasing and converges to 0 as t goes to ∞, by σ-additivity of
probability measures.
Suppose that player 1 plays σ against τ . Then player 1 finds the object with probability u1(σ, τ) =
P(σ,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd). Assume now that player 1 follows σ until a certain odd period T ∈ N, and then
deviates from σ by choosing a state uniformly from period T + 2 onward, and denote this strategy
by σ′. Then player 1 finds the object at period T + 2 with probability (1 − P(σ,τ)(Θ ≤ T + 1))/|S|.
Thus, u1(σ
′, τ) ≥ P(σ,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd, Θ ≤ T ) + (1− P(σ,τ)(Θ ≤ T + 1))/|S|. As σ is an ε-best response
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against τ , it holds that
P(σ,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd) = u1(σ, τ) ≥ u1(σ′, τ)− ε = P(σ′,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd)− ε.
So, since σ and σ′ are identical for Θ ≤ T + 1 this implies
P(σ,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd,Θ ≥ T + 2) ≥ P(σ′,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd,Θ ≥ T + 2)− ε
≥ (1− P(σ,τ)(Θ ≤ T + 1))/|S| − ε
= P(σ,τ)(Θ ≥ T + 2))/|S| − ε
≥ P(σ,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd,Θ ≥ T + 2))/|S|+ P(σ,τ)(Θ =∞)/|S| − ε.
It follows that
P(σ,τ)(Θ =∞) ≤ P(σ,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd,Θ ≥ T + 2)) · (|S| − 1) + ε · |S|
≤ P(σ,τ)(T + 2 ≤ Θ <∞)) · (|S| − 1) + ε · |S|.
As (P(σ,τ)(T + 2 ≤ Θ <∞))T converges to 0 when T goes to ∞, then P(σ,τ)(Θ =∞) ≤ ε · |S|. Thus,
u1(σ, τ) + u2(σ, τ) = P(σ,τ)(Θ <∞) = 1− P(σ,τ)(Θ =∞) ≥ 1− ε · |S|.
We denote v1 = supσ∈Σ infτ∈T u1(σ, τ) and v2 = supτ∈T infσ∈Σ u2(σ, τ).
Proposition 8. The following equalities hold:
v1 = inf
τ∈T
sup
σ∈Σ
u1(σ, τ), (1)
v2 = inf
σ∈Σ
sup
τ∈T
u2(σ, τ). (2)
v1 + v2 = 1. (3)
Proof. First we prove equality (1). In this equality, player 1 is maximizing u1(σ, τ) and player 2 is
minimizing the same expression. Note that (σ, τ) 7→ u1(σ, τ) is bounded. Moreover, by Proposition 21,
it is lower semi-continuous, and hence Borel measurable. Now, equality (1) follows from [22], [23] or
Maitra and Sudderth (1998).
Equality (2) follows similarly.
We now show that v1 + v2 ≤ 1. Let ε > 0 and let (σ, τ) be an ε-equilibrium. We have:
u1(σ, τ) ≥ sup
σ′
u1(σ
′, τ)− ε ≥ inf
τ ′
sup
σ′
u1(σ
′, τ)− ε = v1 − ε.
Similarly, u2(σ, τ) ≥ v2 − ε. Then,
v1 + v2 ≤ u1(σ, τ) + u2(σ, τ) + 2 · ε ≤ 1 + 2 · ε.
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As ε > 0 is arbitrary, we get v1 + v2 ≤ 1.
We now show that v1 + v2 ≥ 1. Let ε > 0 and let (σ′, τ) be a strategy profile where σ′ is an ε-best
response against τ . Then by Lemma 7 we have u1(σ, τ) ≥ 1 − u2(σ, τ) − ε · |S|. Denote Bτε ⊆ Σ the
set of ε-best responses of player 1 against τ . We have
v1 = inf
τ∈T
sup
σ∈Σ
u1(σ, τ)
≥ inf
τ∈T
sup
σ∈Bτε
u1(σ, τ)
≥ inf
τ∈T
sup
σ∈Bτε
[1− u2(σ, τ)− ε · |S|]
= 1− sup
τ∈T
inf
σ∈Bτε
u2(σ, τ)− ε · |S|
≥ 1− sup
τ∈T
inf
σ∈Σ
u2(σ, τ)− ε · |S|
= 1− v2 − ε · |S|.
As ε > 0 is arbitrary, we conclude that v1 + v2 ≥ 1.
The last theorem of this section shows that all ε-equilibria give almost the same payoffs, for small ε.
Theorem 9. For each ε ≥ 0, for each ε-equilibrium (σ, τ):
[1] the object is found with probability at least 1− ε · |S|,
[2] |u1(σ, τ)− v1| ≤ ε and |u2(σ, τ)− v2| ≤ ε,
where v1 and v2 are characterised above Proposition 8.
Proof.
[1] It is a direct consequence from Lemma 7.
[2] Let ε ∈ (0, 1). Let (σ, τ) be an ε-equilibrium. As a consequence of Proposition 8,
u1(σ, τ) ≥ sup
σ′∈Σ
u1(σ
′, τ)− ε ≥ sup inf
σ′∈Σ τ ′∈T
u1(σ
′, τ ′)− ε = v1 − ε.
Similarly, u2(σ, τ) ≥ v2 − ε. Thus
u1(σ, τ) ≤ 1− u2(σ, τ) ≤ 1− (v2 − ε) = v1 + ε.
Similarly, u2(σ, τ) ≤ v2 + ε. Those inequalities give [2].
A competitive search game is not a constant sum game in a strict sense. However, Proposition 8 and
Theorem 9 show that, in essence, it has the same properties as a game in which the payoffs add up
to 1 and thus the players have opposite interest. This leads to the following definition.
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Definition 10. Consider a competitive search game, and let v1 and v2 be as above Proposition 8.
[1] We call v = v1 the value of the game.
[2] For ε ≥ 0, we say that σ ∈ Σ is an ε-optimal strategy for player 1 if u1(σ, τ) ≥ v1 − ε for every
τ ∈ T . Similarly, we say that τ ∈ T is an ε-optimal strategy for player 2 if u2(σ, τ) ≥ v2− ε for
every σ ∈ Σ.
For ε-optimal strategies we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 11. Consider a competitive search game.
[1] For all ε ≥ 0, if (σ, τ) is an ε-equilibrium, then σ and τ are ε-optimal strategies.
[2] For all ε ≥ 0, if σ and τ are ε-optimal strategies, then (σ, τ) is a 2ε-equilibrium.
[3] A strategy profile (σ, τ) is a 0-equilibrium if and only if σ and τ are 0-optimal strategies.
[4] For all ε > 0, each player has a pure ε-optimal strategy.
Proof.
[1] Let (σ, τ) be an ε-equilibrium. Hence, u1(σ, τ) ≥ u1(σ′, τ)−ε for all σ′ ∈ Σ. Then, u1(σ, τ) ≥ v1−ε,
which means that σ is an ε-optimal strategy for player 1. Similarly, τ is an ε-optimal strategy for
player 2.
[2] Assume now that σ and τ are ε-optimal strategies for player 1 and player 2. Let σ′ ∈ Σ. Then,
u2(σ
′, τ) ≥ v2 − ε. By Proposition 8, we get that
u1(σ
′, τ) ≤ 1− u2(σ′, τ) ≤ 1− (v2 − ε) = v1 + ε.
This implies that u1(σ, τ) ≥ v1 − ε ≥ u1(σ′, τ) − 2ε. Similarly, we obtain u2(σ, τ) ≥ u2(σ, τ ′) − 2ε
for every τ ′ ∈ T So, (σ, τ) is a 2ε-equilibrium.
[3] This is a direct consequence of [1] and [2].
[4] This is a consequence of [1] and Theorem 4.
We end this section with a property of the value of time-homogeneous Markov chains. We show that
if the initial probability distribution is exactly an invariant distribution of the transition matrix P ,
then player 1 has a weak advantage.
Proposition 12. Consider a time-homogenenous competitive search game. If pi is an invariant
distribution of P , then v(pi) ≥ 1/2.
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Proof. Assume first that there is a state s ∈ S for which pi(s) = 0. Then pi¬sP = piP = pi. Since
pi(s) = 0 we have v(pi, s) = 1−v(pi). As v(pi) ≥ v(pi, s), we obtain v(pi) ≥ 1−v(pi). Hence, v(pi) ≥ 1/2.
Assume there is no state s ∈ S for which p(s) = 0. Consider the game G′ that arises by adding a state
w to G. More precisely, G′ is the game with set of states S′ = S ∪{w}, initial probability distribution
pi′ such that pi′(s) = pi(s) for each state s ∈ S and pi′(w) = 0, and transition matrix P ′ that has the
same transition probabilities between states in S and makes w absorbing. Then, the object will never
be in w with probability 1. From Step 1 of the proof of [2] in Theorem 15, the players may ignore
state w during the game. Then, pi′ is an invariant distribution of P ′, and hence by the first part we
find v(pi) = v′(pi′) ≥ 1/2.
Remark. We conjecture that if P is irreducible and aperiodic, then v1(pi) > 1/2. The value v1(p)
can be smaller than 1/2 if p is not the invariant distribution. Indeed, for example with three states,
initial probability distribution p = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) and a transition matrix P such that at the second
period the object is in state 1 with probability 1.
5 Additional results
5.1 Subgame optimal strategies
An ε-optimal strategy is a relevant solution concept, but it has the drawback that if the opponent
makes a mistake, the continuation strategy does not have to be ε-optimal. Hence, in this subsection
we examine subgame ε-optimal strategies.
A strategy σ for player 1 is called subgame ε-optimal if, in each subgame, the continuation strategy
of σ is ε-optimal. More precisely, for each history h ∈ Hodd and strategy τ ∈ T for player 2
u1(σ, τ)(h) ≥ v1(h)− ε.
The definition of a subgame ε-optimal strategy for payer 2 is similar. Note that a subgame ε-optimal
strategy is also ε-optimal.
Example 13. In this example, we show that there are ε-optimal strategies that are not subgame
perfect ε-optimal strategies. The set of states is S = {1, 2}, the transition matrix P is the identity
over S and the initial probability distribution is p = (1, 0).
1 2
1 1
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The value of player 1 is v1 = 1 and any optimal strategy of player 1 starts looking at state 1. Then,
v2 = 0 and all the strategies of player 2 are 0-optimal. In particular, it is optimal for player 2 to
always choose state 2. Let τ denote this strategy.
Now suppose that player 1 makes a mistake and chooses state 2 at period 1. Then, the continuation
strategy of τ from period 2 is not optimal. In fact, it would be the best for player 2 to choose state 1
at period 2 and win the game.
Proposition 14. Consider a competitive search game.
1. For every ε > 0, each player has a pure strategy which is subgame ε-optimal.
2. Let ε ∈ (0, 1|S| ). If σ is a subgame ε-optimal strategy for player 1, then for every strategy τ
of player 2, the object is found with probability 1 under the strategy profile (σ, τ). A similar
statement holds for player 2.
Proof. [1] Let ε > 0. In [7] and [8] it is shown that there exists a subgame perfect ε-equilibrium (σ, τ)
in pure strategies. Now consider a subgame at a history h. Since the continuation strategies of σ and
τ at h form an ε-equilibrium, it follows similarly to Proposition 11 that the continuation strategy of
σ at h is ε-optimal in the subgame, and similarly the continuation strategy of τ at h is ε-optimal in
the subgame. Hence, σ and τ are subgame ε-optimal.
[2] Let ε ∈ (0, 1|S| ) and let σ be a subgame ε-optimal strategy. Consider a history h at an odd period.
The strategy for player 1 which looks at a state with the highest probability guarantees 1/|S| in the
subgame at h. So, v(h) ≥ 1/|S|.
Now consider a strategy τ for player 2. Then, we have u1(σ, τ)(h) ≥ 1/|S| − ε > 0. In particular, in
the subgame at h, the object is found with probability at least 1/|S| − ε > 0 under (σ, τ). Since this
holds for every history h at an odd period, by Le´vy’s zero-one law, the object is found with probability
1 under (σ, τ).
5.2 Structure of the optimal actions
In this subsection, we present some structural properties of the optimal actions. For all s ∈ S and for
all p ∈ ∆(S), we denote by v1(p) the value of the game with initial probability distribution p, and by
v1(p, s) the expected payoff of player 1 if he chooses state s at period 1 when the initial distribution
is p, assuming that both players will play optimally afterwards. For each state s ∈ S, let es ∈ ∆(S)
denote the probability distribution which allocates probability 1 to state s and probability 0 on the
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other states. Thus, v1(e
s) = v1(e
s, s) = 1 and for all p ∈ ∆(S)\{es},
v1(p, s) = p(s) + (1− p(s)) · (1− v1(p¬sP )) = 1− (1− p(s)) · v1(p¬sP ),
where p¬s is the probability distribution p conditional to the fact that the object is not in state s. In
other words, p¬s(s) = 0 and p¬s(j) = p(j)1−p(s) for all j 6= s. Note that v1(p) = maxs∈S v1(p, s). We
also denote for all s ∈ S the set As of the initial probability distributions for which it is optimal for
player 1 to look at state s at period 1. In other words, As = {p ∈ ∆(S) | v1(p, s) = v1(p)}. Note that
∪s∈SAs = ∆(S).
Theorem 15. The optimality regions As have the following properties.
[1] If the initial probability p is sufficiently close to es, for some state s, then choosing state s is the
only optimal action. That is, the region As\ ∪j 6=s Aj is a neighborhood of es in ∆(S).
[2] Looking at a state in which the object is with zero probability is never better than looking anywhere
else. That is, for all states s, s′ ∈ S, for all p ∈ ∆(S), if p(s′) = 0 then v1(p, s′) ≤ v1(p, s).
[3] For each subset N ⊆ S, the convex hull of the vertices es with s ∈ N is included in the set ∪s∈NAs.
[4] There is an initial distribution at which choosing any state is optimal. That is, ∩s∈SAs 6= ∅.
[5] For all s ∈ S, the region As is star convex centered in es. That is, if p ∈ As then the whole line
segment between p and es is included in As.
Proof.
[1] The statement follows from the facts that each v(p, s) is continuous (cf. Theorem 23) in p and that
v(es, s) = 1 and v(es, j) < 1 for all j 6= s.
[2] Assume p(s′) = 0 for some state s′ ∈ S. Let s ∈ S. Let (σ, τ) be a strategy profile such that
σ1(∅) = s and σ and τ be Markov strategies : for each t ∈ Nodd (resp. t ∈ Neven), σt (resp. τt) is
constant over the set Ht. Let σ
′ ∈ Σ be a Markov strategy of player 1 that starts looking at state s′.
Let p ∈ ∆(S) and remark that p = p(s) · es + (1 − p(s)) · p¬s for all s ∈ S, where es ∈ ∆(S) is the
vector with es(s) = 1 and es(j) = 0 for all j 6= s. We have :
u1(σ
′, τ)(p) = p(s) · u1(σ′, τ)(es) + (1− p(s)) · u1(σ′, τ)(p¬s)
≤ p(s) · 1 + (1− p(s)) · u1(σ′, τ)(p¬s)
= p(s) · 1 + (1− p(s)) · u1(σ, τ)(p¬s)
= p(s) · u1(σ, τ)(es) + (1− p(s)) · u1(σ, τ)(p¬s)
= u1(σ, τ)(p).
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where the first equality comes from the linearity of the payoff function in respect of p (see Section 22),
the first inequality comes from the fact that the payoffs are bounded from above by 1, the second
equality comes from the fact [p¬s](s) = [p¬s](s′) = 0 and that the game played will be the same as
σ, σ′ and τ are not behavioral, the third equality comes from u1(σ, τ)(es) = 1 as σ1(∅) = s, and the
fourth equality comes from the linearity of the payoff in respect of p. Taking the supremum over σ
and the infimum over τ on both sides, we get v1(p, s
′) ≤ v1(p, s).
[3] Let p ∈ conv({es|s ∈ N}). Then p(s) = 0 for all s /∈ N . By [2], there is an optimal action j ∈ N ,
and hence p ∈ ∪s∈NAs.
[4] We will use the Knaster-Kuratowski-Mazurkiewicz (KKM) theorem4, see [19]. Note that by The-
orem 23, the function p 7→ v(p, s) is continuous for all s ∈ S. Thus, each region As is closed. From
this fact and from [3], we can apply the KKM theorem. We conclude from the KKM Theorem that
∩s∈SAs 6= ∅.
[5] Let s ∈ S, let p ∈ As and let λ ∈ [0, 1]. We want to show that λes + (1− λ)p ∈ As. Let (σ, τ) be a
strategy profile. By equation (5)
sup
σ
u1(σ, τ)(λe
s + (1− λ)p) = sup
σ
[λ · u1(σ, τ)(es) + (1− λ) · u1(σ, τ)(p)]
≤ λ ·
[
sup
σ
u1(σ, τ)(e
s)
]
+ (1− λ) ·
[
sup
σ
u1(σ, τ)(p)
]
= λ+ (1− λ) ·
[
sup
σ
u1(σ, τ)(p)
]
,
where we used that u1(σ, τ)(e
s) = 1 for any strategy σ that looks at state s at period 1. Hence
v(λes+(1−λ)p) = inf
τ
sup
σ
u1(σ, τ)(λe
s+(1−λ)p) ≤ λ+(1−λ)·
[
inf
τ
sup
σ
u1(σ, τ)(p)
]
= λ+(1−λ)·v(σ, τ).
On the other hand, by theorem 22, v(λes + (1 − λ)p, s) = λ + (1 − λ) · v(p, s). So, choosing s when
the initial probability distribution is λes + (1− λ)p is optimal.
Example 16. Consider the case in which the set of states is S = {1, 2, 3}. Let Q =
1 0 00 1 0
1
2
1
2 0
. The
sets A1, A2 and A3 are represented in the time-homogeneous case where the transition matrix is the
identity matrix in Figure 3, and the matrix Q in Figure 4.
Example 16 illustrates the statements of Theorem 15. It particular here are some remarks.
• It makes intuitive sense that if the object is in a certain state with probability close to 1, then
4The KKM theorem states: Let n ∈ N be the cardinal of the set of states S, in other words |S| = n. Let ∆n be the
simplex in Rn. A KKM covering is defined as a collection C1, . . . , Cn of closed sets such that for any N ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
the convex hull of the vertices corresponding to N is covered by ∪s∈NCs. Then any KKM covering has a non-empty
intersection, i.e.: ∩s∈SCs 6= ∅.
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Figure 3: P = I3. From left to right, the sets ∆(S), A1, A2, A3.
Figure 4: P = Q
it is optimal to look at this state. Geometrically, this means that for all states s ∈ S, the set As
contains a neighborhood of es in ∆(S).
• Looking at a state s′ such that p(s′) = 0 can still be (weakly) optimal. For example, in Figure 3
with initial probability distribution p = (1/2, 1/2, 0), looking at state 3 is just as good as looking
at either state 1 or state 2.
• Figure 3 illustrates that the intersection of the regions Ai can be more than a single point.
• Figure 3 illustrates the sets As are not always convex. However we conjecture that their relative
interior is convex, in which case the closure of the relative interior of the sets As are polytopes.
6 Variations
In this section we study two related versions of the search game: first where the horizon of the game
is finite, and second through discounting when the players want to find the object as soon as possible.
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As we will see, the ε-optimal strategies of the original model are robust, in the sense that they are
2ε-optimal if the horizon of the game is finite but sufficiently long, and they are also 2ε-optimal in
the discounted version of the game, provided that the discount factor is close to 1. Similarly, each
strategy that is optimal on a finite but sufficiently long horizon or for a high discount factor is also
ε-optimal in the original search game. In particular, as the optimal strategies over the finite horizon
games can be calculated easily, we obtain ε-optimal strategies in the original search game that are
easy to calculate and to implement.
6.1 The finite horizon version of the search game
Suppose that the game ends at a specific period T ∈ N, if it has not ended before. For simplicity, we
will focus on player 1. Let
u1,T (σ, τ) = P(σ,τ)(Θ ∈ Nodd, Θ ≤ T )
denote the probability that player 1 finds the object within the T first periods under (σ, τ). We assume
that player 1 is maximizing u1,T whereas player 2 is minimizing u1,T . This is a zero-sum game which
has value
v1,T := max
σ
min
τ
u1,T (σ, τ) = min
τ
max
σ
u1,T (σ, τ).
Note that, with exchanged roles of the players, we could also define v2,T . However, since the game
has finite horizon, it may have a positive probability under each strategy profile that the object is
not found, so it will not always be true that v1,T + v2,T = 1; in contrasts with Proposition 8 for the
infinite horizon.
An advantage of the finite horizon compared to the infinite horizon is that the value in finite horizon
can be computed explicitly via the following dynamic programming equations:
v1,1(p) = v1,2(p) = ||p||∞,
v1,T (p) = max
s1
min
s2
p(s1) + (1− p(s1)(1− [p¬s1P1](s2)) · v1,T−2([p¬s1P1]¬s2P2), T ≥ 3 odd.
As we mentioned in the beginning of this section, the finite horizon search game is strongly related to
the original search game.
Definition 17. Let α ∈ (0, 1). A transition matrix P is α-strongly mixed if for all (i, j) ∈ S × S,
P (i, j) ≥ α.
Theorem 18. Consider a competitive search game.
[1] Let ε > 0. Let σ∗ ∈ Σ be an ε-optimal strategy for player 1 in the original search game, and for
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all T ∈ N, let σ∗T be a strategy for player 1 such that u1,T (σ∗T , τ) ≥ v1,T for each strategy τ of player
2. Then, there exists T˜ ∈ N such that for all T ≥ T˜ , for all strategies τ ∈ T ,
u1,T (σ
∗, τ) ≥ v1 − 2ε ≥ v1,T − 2ε, and u1,T (σ∗T , τ) ≥ v1 − ε ≥ v1,T − ε. (4)
Consequently, v1,T converges to v1 as T goes to ∞.
[2] If there exists a real number α ∈ (0, 1) such that for all T ∈ N the transition matrix PT at period
T is α-strongly mixed, then for all T ∈ N
v1 ≥ v1,T ≥ v1 − (1− α)T−1.
[3] Analogous statements hold for player 2.
Proof.
Proof of [1]. The second inequality in (4) and the fourth inequality in (4) are trivial. We now
prove that for large T the first inequality of (4) holds. Assume by way of contradiction that for every
T˜ ∈ N, there exists T ≥ T˜ and there is a strategy τT such that u1,T (σ∗, τT ) < v1 − 2ε. Since the set
of strategies T for player 2 is compact, by taking a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that τT
converges to some strategy τ as T →∞. Note that for every T ′ ≤ T we have
u1,T ′(σ
∗, τT ) ≤ u1,T (σ, τT ) < v1 − 2ε.
By taking the limit for T →∞, we find u1,T ′(σ∗, τ) ≤ v1−2ε. Since this holds for all T ′, when taking
the limit for T ′ →∞, we obtain u1(σ∗, τ) ≤ v1 − 2ε < v1 − ε. This is a contradiction with the choice
of σ∗. Thus, the inequality (4) holds.
Now we prove that for large T the third inequality of 4 holds. Choose T˜ so that the first inequality
of 4 holds for ε/2. Then
u1,T (σT , τ) ≥ v1,T = max
σ
min
τ
u1,T (σ, τ) ≥ min
τ
u1,T (σ, τ) ≥ v1 − ε.
Proof of [2]. The first inequality is trivial. Assume that there exists a real number α ∈ (0, 1) such
that for all T ∈ N the transition matrix PT at period T is α-strongly mixed. Let T ∈ N. We use the
following notations:
• σ∗T is an optimal strategy for player 1 in the zero-sum game with payoffs (u1,T ,−u1,T ),
• σ−T an optimal strategy for player 1 in the zero-sum game with payoffs (−u2,T , u2,T ),
• τ∗T an optimal strategy for player 2 in the zero-sum game with payoffs (−u2,T , u2,T ),
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• τ−T an optimal strategy for player 2 in the zero-sum game with payoffs (u1,T ,−u1,T ).
Let (σ, τ) be a strategy profile. We have:
u1,T (σ, τ) + u2,T (σ, τ) = u1,T−1(σ, τ) + u2,T−1(σ, τ) + P(σ,τ)(Θ = T )
≥ u1,T−1(σ, τ) + u2,T−1(σ, τ) + [1− u1,T−1(σ, τ)− u2,T−1(σ, τ)] · α
= (1− α) · [u1,T−1(σ, τ) + u2,T−1(σ, τ)] + α.
Then,
u1,T (σ, τ) + u2,T (σ, τ)− 1 ≥ (1− α) · [u1,T−1(σ, τ) + u2,T−1(σ, τ)− 1] ,
which implies by induction
u1,T (σ, τ) + u2,T (σ, τ)− 1 ≥ (1− α)T−1 · [u1,1(σ, τ) + u2,1(σ, τ)− 1]
= (1− α)T−1 · [p(σ(∅))− 1].
Thus,
u1,T (σ, τ) + u2,T (σ, τ) ≥ 1− (1− α)T−1 · [1− p(σ(∅))] ≥ 1− (1− α)T−1.
In particular,
u1,T (σ
∗
T , τ
−
T ) + u2,T (σ
−
T , τ
∗
T ) ≥ u1,T (σ−T , τ−T ) + u2,T (σ−T , τ−T )
≥ 1− (1− α)T−1
= v1 + v2 − (1− α)T−1
As u2,T (σ
−
T , τ
∗
T ) = v2,T ≤ v2, it implies
v1,T ≥ u1,T (σ∗T , τ−T ) ≥ v1 − (1− α)T−1.
6.2 The discounted version of the search game
Now we examine the discounted optimal strategies, once again with focus on player 1. For a discount
factor β ∈ (0, 1) and strategy pair (σ, τ), let
u1,β(σ, τ) =
∑
t∈Nodd
βt−1Pσ,τ (Θ = t),
which is the expected discounted time that player 1 finds the object, not counting the instances
where the object is not found. We assume that player 1 is maximizing u1,β whereas player 2 is
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minimizing u1,β . This is a zero-sum game. Let v1,β denote corresponding the value, and let σβ denote
a pure optimal5 strategy of player 1. Note that the value and such a strategy σβ exist, because the
discounted payoff is continuous (cf. for example Fudenberg and Levine (1983)). With exchanged roles
of the players, we can also define v2,β , and due to discounting we generally do not have v1,β+v2,β = 1.
As we mentioned in the beginning of this section, the discounted search game is strongly related to
the original search game.
Theorem 19. Consider a competitive search game.
[1] Let ε > 0. Let σ ∈ Σ be an ε-optimal strategy for player 1, and for all β ∈ (0, 1), let σ∗β be a
strategy for player 1 such that u1,β(σ
∗
β , τ) ≥ v1,β for each strategy τ of player 2. Then, there exists
β˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all β ∈ (β˜, 1), for all strategies τ ∈ T ,
u1,β(σ, τ) ≥ v1 − 2ε, and u1(σ∗β , τ) ≥ v1 − ε.
Consequently, v1,β → v1 as β → 1.
[2] Analogous statements hold for player 2.
Proof.
Proof of [1]. For every T ∈ N let δ(T ) ∈ (0, 1) such that (δ(T ))T−1 ≥ 1 − 1T 2 . Then, for every
β ∈ [δ(T ), 1) and every strategy profile (σ, τ)
u1,β(σ, τ) ≥
∑
t=Nodd
t≤T
βt−1 · P(σ,τ)(Θ = t) ≥
∑
t=Nodd
t≤T
(
1− 1T 2
) · P(σ,τ)(Θ = t) ≥ u1,T (σ, τ)− 1T .
Hence, for all ε > 0, for all T > 1ε , the statements of the theorem follow from Theorem 18.
7 Concluding remarks and future work
We introduced an infinite horizon search game, in which two players compete to find an object that
moves according to a time-varying Markov chain. We prove that these games always admit an ε-
equilibrium in pure strategies, for all error-terms ε > 0, but not necessarily a 0-equilibrium. We
showed that the ε-equilibrium payoffs converge to a singleton (v, 1 − v) as ε vanishes, and therefore
the game is essentially a zero-sum game with value v. We examined the analytical and structural
properties of the solutions, and demonstrated that they are robust to having a finite but long horizon
5In discounted games, one usually considers stationary strategies. In our model, the natural state space would be
the set ∆(S) of possible probability distributions for the location of the object (often called the belief space, as the
players only have a belief where the object could be). Since this space is infinite, and states are often only visited once,
we omit the detailed discussion of stationarity.
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and respectively to having a sufficiently large discount factor. We devoted attention to the important
special case when the Markov chain is time-homogeneous, where stronger results hold.
It would be interesting to generalize the results when the active player is chosen according to an
arbitrary stochastic process. Also, one could introduce overlooking probabilities to the model. In that
case, even if the active player chooses the state that currently contains the object, there is a positive
probability that the player fails to find it. In the companion paper [5], we examine the variation in
which the active player is chosen randomly at each period.
A Topological properties of search games
We endow the strategy spaces Σ =
∏
h∈Hodd ∆(S) and T =
∏
h∈Heven ∆(S) with the topology of
pointwise convergence. This is identical with the product topology on Σ and the product topology on
T . Under this topology, the spaces Σ and T are compact, and as Hodd and Heven are countable, Σ
and T are also metrizable.
Definition 20. Let X be a topological space. A function f : X → R is called lower semi-continuous at
x ∈ X if, for every sequence xn → x, we have lim infn→∞ f(xn) ≥ f(x). A function f : X → R is called
upper semi-continuous at x ∈ X if, for every sequence xn → x, we have lim supn→∞ f(xn) ≤ f(x).
A function f : X → R is called continuous at x ∈ X if it is lower semi-continuous at x and upper
semi-continuous at x.
A function f : X → R is called lower semi-continuous (resp. upper semi-continuous, resp. continuous)
if f is lower semi-continuous at all x ∈ X (resp. upper semi-continuous at all x ∈ X, resp. continuous
at all x ∈ X).
Proposition 21. Take a player i ∈ {1, 2}.
[1] The payoff function ui : Σ× T → R is lower semi-continuous.
[2] Assume that (σ, τ) is a strategy profile under which the object is found with probability 1. Then,
ui is continuous at (σ, τ).
Proof.
[1] For each strategy profile (σ, τ) ∈ Σ×T , for each period n ∈ N, we denote by uni (σ, τ) the probability
that player i finds the object during the first n periods under the strategy profile (σ, τ). Note that
uni (σ, τ) is non-decreasing in n and converges to ui(σ, τ) as n→∞.
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Let (σk, τk)k∈N be a sequence in Σ×T converging to a strategy profile (σ, τ). We have for each n ∈ N
uni (σ, τ) = lim
k→∞
uni (σ
k, τk) = lim inf
k→∞
uni (σ
k, τk) ≤ lim inf
k→∞
ui(σ
k, τk).
Since uni (σ, τ) converges to ui(σ, τ) as n→∞, we obtain
ui(σ, τ) ≤ lim inf
k→∞
ui(σ
k, τk),
which proves that ui is lower semi-continuous.
[2] Assume that under the strategy profile (σ, τ) the object is found with probability 1. Thus, u1(σ, τ)+
u2(σ, τ) = 1. Due to part 1, we only need to show that u1 and u2 are upper semi-continuous at (σ, τ).
We will prove it for u1; the proof for u2 is similar.
Let (σk, τk)k∈N be a sequence in Σ× T converging to (σ, τ). Then
lim sup
k→∞
u1(σ
k, τk) = 1− lim inf
k→∞
(1− u1(σk, τk)) ≤ 1− lim inf
k→∞
u2(σ
k, τk) ≤ 1− u2(σ, τ) = u1(σ, τ),
where the first equality is a classic supinf equality applied to a limit, the first inequality comes from
u1 + u2 ≤ 1, the second inequality follows from part 1, and the second equality comes from the
assumption we made on (σ, τ). Hence, u1 is upper semi-continuous at (σ, τ), as desired.
B Functional properties of the value function
In this section we discuss some general functional properties of the value function p 7→ v(p). The first
theorem is devoted to linear properties and the second theorem to Lipschitz-continuity. We remind
that the function p 7→ v1(p, s) was introduced at the beginning of the subsection 5.2.
Theorem 22. Let (σ, τ) be a strategy profile. Then the expected payoff functions are linear in the
initial probability distribution of the object: for every λ ∈ [0, 1], for every p, q ∈ ∆(S), for every player
i = 1, 2,
ui(σ, τ)(λp+ (1− λ)q) = λ · ui(σ, τ)(p) + (1− λ) · ui(σ, τ)(q). (5)
Moreover, for every s ∈ S, the map p 7→ v(p, s) is linear over every line passing through es (the initial
probability distribution having probability 1 on state s): for every p ∈ ∆(S), for every λ ∈ (0, 1)
v(λes + (1− λ)p, s) = λ+ (1− λ) · v(p, s).
Proof. First we prove equality (5). The probability distribution λ · p+ (1− λ) · q can be interpreted
as follows: with probability λ the initial probability distribution is p and induces the expected payoff
ui(σ, τ)(p) for player i, and with probability (1− λ) the probability distribution is q and induces the
expected payoff ui(σ, τ, q) for player i. Hence, the equality (5) holds.
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Now we prove the second part of the theorem. Let p ∈ ∆(S), p 6= es, and let λ ∈ (0, 1), and denote
p¬s the linear projection of x from es to the face {y ∈ ∆(S)|ys = 0}. Then
(λes + (1− λ)p)¬s = p¬s.
Indeed, (λes + (1− λ)p)¬s(s) = 0 = [p¬s](s) and for all j 6= s:
(λes + (1− λ)p)¬s(j) = (λe
s + (1− λ)p)(j)
1− (λes + (1− λ)p)(s) =
(1− λ) · p(j)
1− (λ+ (1− λ) · p(s))
=
(1− λ) · p(j)
(1− λ) · (1− p(s)) =
p(j)
(1− p(s)) =
p(j)
1− p(s) = [p
¬s](j).
Hence, by using (λes + (1− λ)p)(s) = λ+ (1− λ) · p(s) we have
v(λes + (1− λ)p, s)
= (λes + (1− λ)p)(s) + (1− (λes + (1− λ)p)(s)) · (1− v((λes + (1− λ)p)¬sP ))
= (λes + (1− λ)p)(s) + (1− (λes + (1− λ)p)(s)) · (1− v(p¬sP ))
= λ+ (1− λ)(p(s) + (1− p(s)) · (1− v(p¬sP )))
= λ+ (1− λ) · v(p, s),
which completes the proof.
Remark. For each line passing through es, the linearity of the function p 7→ v(p, s) relies on the
fact that if by choosing state s player 1 does not find the object, then the conditional distribution
of the location of the object, p¬s, stays on the same line. For lines not passing through es, this is
no longer true, and the function p 7→ v(p, s) is generally non-linear. For example when P = I4,
p = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3, 0) and p′ = (1/3, 1/3, 0, 1/3). In that case, v(p, 1) = 2/3 and v(p′, 1) = 2/3, but
v1(p/2 + p
′/2, 1) = 1/2.
Before introducing the next theorem, we recall the definition of the total variation distance: for
p, q ∈ ∆(S), the total variation distance between p and q is the non-negative number
||p− q||TV = max
S′⊂S
∑
s∈S′
[p(s)− q(s)].
Theorem 23. Let p, q ∈ ∆(S). Let T ∈ N and let (σ, τ) be a strategy profile. Then, the functions p 7→
u1,T (σ, τ)(p), p 7→ u1(σ, τ)(p), p 7→ v1,T (p), p 7→ v1(p, s) and p 7→ v1(p) are 1-Lipschitz continuous
with respect to the total variation distance.
Proof. By Theorem 22, we have
u1(σ, τ)(p) =
∑
s∈S
p(s) · u1(σ, τ)(es),
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u1(σ, τ)(q) =
∑
s∈S
q(s) · u1(σ, τ)(es).
Then,
u1(σ, τ)(p)− u1(σ, τ)(q) =
∑
s∈S
[p(s)− q(s)] · u1(σ, τ)(es) ≤
∑
s∈S,
p(s)>q(s)
[p(s)− q(s)] = ||p− q||TV ,
and similarly
u1(σ, τ)(q)− u1(σ, τ)(p) ≤ ||p− q||TV .
Hence, p 7→ u1(σ, τ)(p) is 1-Lipschitz-continuous.
Taking the infimum over τ and the supremum over σ on both sides of the inequality u1(σ, τ)(p) ≤
u1(σ, τ)(q)+||p−q||TV gives v1(p) ≤ ||p−q||TV +v1(q), which can be written v1(p)−v1(q) ≤ ||p−q||TV .
Similarly, v1(q)− v1(p) ≤ ||p− q||TV . Hence, p 7→ v1(p) is 1-Lipschitz-continuous too.
The proof for p 7→ u1,T (σ, τ)(p) and p 7→ v1,T (σ, τ) are similar. The proof for p 7→ v1(p, s) is also
similar, but the supremum in σ has to be taken over the strategies that look at state s at period 1.
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